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The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the role of commercial banks and investment banks as financial advisors.  
Unlike some areas of investment banking, commercial banks have always been allowed to 
compete directly with traditional investment banks in this area.  In their role as lenders and 
advisors, banks can be viewed as serving a certification function.  However, banks acting as both 
lenders and advisors face a potential conflict of interest that may mitigate or offset any 
certification effect. Overall, we find evidence of the certification effect for target firms, but 
conflicts of interest for acquirers.   
 
In particular, the target earns higher abnormal returns when the target’s own bank certifies the 
(more informationally opaque) target’s value to the acquirer.  In contrast, we find no certification 
role for acquirers.  This may be due to two reasons.  First, certification plays less of a role for 
acquirers because it is the target firm that must be priced in a merger.  Second, acquirers 
predominantly utilize commercial bank advisors in order to obtain access to bank loans that may 
be used to finance the post-merger transition period.  Thus, we find that acquirers tend to choose 
their own banks (those with prior lending relationships to the acquirer) as advisors in mergers.  
However, this choice weakens any certification effect and creates a potential conflict of interest 
because the acquirer’s advisor negotiates the terms of both the merger transaction and future loan 
commitments.  Moreover, the advisor’s merger advice may be distorted by considerations related 
to the bank’s credit exposure resulting from both past and future lending activity.  The market 
prices these conflicts of interest; we find significantly negative abnormal returns for bank 
advisors when they advise their own loan customers in acquiring other firms. 
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The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
1. Introduction 
Financial intermediaries are specialists in information production and processing.  As 
advisors to both targets and acquirers, financial institutions utilize their information gathering 
expertise to ascertain the reservation price of the merger counterparty, the potential for 
synergistic gains, as well as the risks of the transaction.   
Commercial banks may be well positioned to offer these services if they have established 
lending and other customer relationships with either party to a merger. During the course of a 
long-term customer relationship, a commercial bank obtains private information about a firm’s 
cash flows, financial resources, and other exposures that can be useful in estimating the future 
prospects of a proposed merger.  Indeed, if the role of the financial advisor in a merger is to 
mobilize information, then commercial banks – especially those with prior lending relationships - 
potentially have a comparative advantage over investment banks in advising their customers – 
particularly since, until very recently, investment banks did not make commercial loans.1  The 
banking literature (see Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1986) for example) suggests that 
information generated in the course of a banking relationship may be reusable and therefore 
transferable.  This transfer is feasible because while SEC regulations and the U.S. bankruptcy 
code prohibit the transfer of information from an investment bank subsidiary to a related 
                                                 
1 Investment banks may grant “bridge loans” particularly in the context of facilitating a merger.  Since these loans are 
of short duration, granted for very specific purposes, they are not likely to produce the private information obtained 
by a commercial bank in the course of a long-term, generalized business lending relationship.  We exclude the 
consideration of these less informative “bridge loans” from our analysis.   Michaely and Womack (1999) consider 
another potential conflicts of interest for investment bank advisor stemming from the relationship between analyst 
recommendations and underwriting activity.  Before the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act, this conflict did not apply 
to commercial banks because they could not offer full service investment banking services that included investment 
advice.  See the 1994 Supreme Court decision involving Citicorp. 
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commercial bank subsidiary, there are no restrictions on the reuse of information obtained in the 
course of a standard banking relationship (e.g., on information flows from the bank’s lending 
department to the investment bank).2 
Following a parallel literature dealing with underwriting activities,3  we refer to a bank’s 
ability to mobilize private information about a customer, and to use this information in supplying 
services such as merger advice to the customer, as the certification effect.  Investment banks may 
also be privy to private information obtained, for example, in the course of underwriting 
activities.  However, underwriting episodes are discrete and intermittent, corresponding to the 
relatively short time period surrounding the issue registration, offering period, and after-market 
support period.  In contrast, commercial bank lending and other relationships are often long 
standing and continuous, requiring the ongoing monitoring of the firm’s activities.  All else being 
equal, we would expect that the selection and use of a commercial bank advisor in an M&A 
transaction provides a higher certification effect than that provided by traditional investment 
banks.4   
There are, however, countervailing influences to the certification effect that may limit the 
effectiveness of commercial banks in providing merger advisory services.  This is especially so if 
the bank advisor is faced with one or more conflicts of interest.  For example, the target may 
have financial problems known privately only to its lenders (such as the major bank lender), or 
an acquirer may be financially weak to the private knowledge of the banker, and its ability to 
                                                 
2 In June 1997, the courts ruled in ADP v. Chase Manhattan Bank  that “a bank has no per se obligation to refrain 
from such participation” as advisor to an acquirer (Western Resources) in a hostile attempt to take over Chase’s 
banking customer ADP Ltd. (Michael Bender, Investment Dealers’ Digest, June 30, 1997, p. 9-10.) 
3  See Puri (1994, 1996), Ang and Richardson (1994), Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Gande, Puri, Saunders, and 
Walter (1997), and Hebb (1999). 
4 See Fama (1985), Diamond (1991), and Rajan (1992) and the special issue of the Journal of Financial 
Intermediation (2000) for a discussion of the information generated in the course of relationship intermediation.  
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survive and pay off its bank debt may be enhanced through the acquisition of a target with a 
sizable free cash flow.  In these situations, the commercial bank’s certification may not be 
credible because of the bank’s self-interest in assuring the completion of the merger.  This 
conflict of interest effect is likely to be exacerbated in the case of hostile takeovers.  For 
example, if a commercial bank customer (as a target) objects to an acquisition, perhaps because 
of entrenched managers’ fear of loss of control, then the commercial bank may be either unable 
or unwilling to utilize fully its private information in advising a potential acquirer for fear of the 
loss of future commercial banking business should the merger actually fail to be completed.  
Moreover, a commercial bank may be able to attract merger advisory business only on the 
condition that bank loans are made available to the merger counterparties, or alternatively, a bank 
may be more willing to advise a firm to undertake an acquisition if it believes it can earn large 
fees from financing the merger through its lending department.  These may constitute conflicts of 
interest to the extent that the bank’s advice is skewed by the bank’s concern about the profit it 
earns from its lending as well as is merger advisory services.5 
The aim of this paper is to examine, empirically, whether the certification effect 
dominates the conflict of interest effect in the market for mergers and acquisitions advice, and to 
measure the relative effects on targets and acquirers of commercial bank participation as merger 
advisors. We compare stock market (abnormal) returns to acquirers and targets on merger deals 
where commercial banks have been the advisors relative to deals advised by a control group of 
                                                 
5 The potential for conflicts of interest was raised in the case of Lehman Brothers, the advisor for Dynegy, the 
erstwhile acquirer of Enron Corporation in the context of repayment of a $179 million swap transaction.  
“…Lehman’s dual agenda – pursuing a possible merger and in the same set of talks its own repayment – presents a 
possible conflict of interest, some investment-banking specialists say.  That is because Lehman’s interest in seeking 
repayment during the talks could have complicated Dynegy’s ability to strike a deal….Of course, Lehman isn’t the 
only firm acting in dual roles in Enron matters.  Until recently, Citigroup Inc. and JP Morgan Chase & Co. had been 
acting as both merger advisors and lenders to Enron.  Now that Enron has sought bankruptcy-law protection from 
creditors, those two banking firms have been precluded from serving as advisors because of their creditor status.” 
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top tier investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter) as well as a control group of mid tier investment banks (Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, PaineWebber and Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette).6  In the 
investment bank control groups, there is no commercial bank advisor participation at all.7  
When we control for prior banking relationships, we find evidence of a net certification 
effect for commercial banks.  However, this effect holds only for commercial banks’ role as 
M&A advisors to targets.  Target firms are typically smaller and more informationally opaque 
firms than acquiring firms.  Banks that advise target firms can reuse information obtained in the 
course of a prior banking relationship by certifying the value of the merger (e.g., whether the 
price the acquirer offers to pay for the target is appropriate).  The target bank’s private 
information about the target firm is particularly valuable because of information asymmetries 
that make it difficult to certify the value of the target, and because it is the target firm that must 
be priced in a merger.  However, this certification effect is likely to be reduced if the target bank 
advises the acquirer, since the target’s bank may be reluctant to reveal bad information about the 
target to the acquirer for fear that if the deal is not completed, the target will penalize the bank 
with the loss of its banking business.  Indeed, we find that acquirer’s abnormal returns are either 
negative or statistically insignificant both when the target’s bank and the acquirer’s bank advises 
the acquirer, and that the use of commercial bank advisors with prior banking relationships has 
no significant impact on acquirer abnormal returns.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Smith (2001), p. C1, C11. 
6 The identities of the top tier and mid tier investment banks were obtained from Merger Advisory League Tables 
compiled by Thomson Financial and Garner and Kale (2001). 
7 In the wake of the passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 1999, financial holding companies (FHC) can be 
formulated by merging commercial banks and investment banks.  For the purposes of this study, we consider any 
financial institution with a substantial commercial bank subsidiary to be a “commercial bank.”  Thus, we classify 
Citigroup (an FHC) as a commercial bank. 
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Acquirers are not indifferent to commercial bank relationships, however.  We find that if 
an acquiring firm has had a prior lending relationship with a commercial bank, then the acquirer 
is more likely to utilize that bank as its financial advisor.  This is not because of an informational 
certification effect, but rather due to the bank’s implicit (or explicit) promise of bank loans to 
finance the merger transaction and post-merger transition.  Thus, it is the combination of merger 
advisory services and access to bank credit that is the focus of acquirer concerns in choosing their 
financial advisor.   This creates a potential conflict of interest for the bank advisors.  Indeed, we 
find that bank advisor abnormal returns are significantly reduced when banks offer these 
“package deals” that combine loan commitments with merger advisory services.  
Section 2 briefly reviews the extensive literature on mergers and acquisitions.  In Section 
3, we describe our methodology.  The database is described in Section 4 and the empirical results 
are discussed in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Literature 
Several branches of the literature are relevant to our study.  First, there is the literature 
concerning the role of advisors in creating (or destroying) value in mergers and acquisitions.  
Second, there is the literature comparing the role of investment banks with that of commercial 
banks in undertaking “investment banking-type activities.”  Third, there is the literature 
investigating the value of mergers and acquisitions per se.  Rather than providing an exhaustive 
review, we examine selected papers’ relevance to the issue at hand. 
2.1  Do Advisors Add Value in Mergers? 
There is a literature examining whether advisors add value to a merger.  Bowers and 
Miller (1990) examine the relationship between an acquiring firm’s stock returns and the choice 
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of investment bank to determine whether first-tier investment banks generate better deals in 
terms of value creation.  They classified the following as first-tier investment banks: First 
Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Brothers.  They report 
that total wealth gains are larger when either the target or acquirer uses a first-tier investment 
bank.  The results suggest the importance of the advisor’s credibility (reputation) in acquisitions. 
Hunter and Walker (1990) find that merger gains relate positively to investment banking 
fees and other proxies for investment banker effort.  However, McLaughlin (1990, 1992) reports 
that some incentive features of investment banking contracts can create conflicts of interest 
between an investment bank and its clients, suggesting the importance of a potential for a conflict 
of interest between advisors and clients in mergers and acquisitions.  
Servaes and Zenner (1996) compare acquisitions that were completed in-house versus 
those that use investment bank advisors. They find that an investment bank is used in more 
complex transactions with asymmetric information, documenting the importance of the 
information collection process in mergers and acquisitions. 
Building on the theoretical model in James (1992), Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) finds 
that merger advisory fees include a relationship premium that is consistent with the existence of 
switching costs borne by acquirers when they hire new advisors with whom they had no prior 
relationship.  If merger fees are set competitively, an explanation for this relationship premium is 
a certification effect, whereby rents are paid to banks with superior information obtained in the 
course of a prior relationship.  Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) also find that top tier advisors 
charge higher fees than lower tier investment banks, and that acquirers pay a relationship 
premium in merger fees that is highest for top tier advisors.   Although Rau (2000) finds no 
impact of advisors on acquirer abnormal returns, he shows a positive relationship between 
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investment bank market share and fees and deal completion rates.  That is, top-tier investment 
bank advisors create value by increasing the likelihood that the deal will be completed.   
These previous studies examine only those mergers advised by investment banks.  We 
extend the literature by examining whether a commercial bank’s greater potential net certification 
ability contributes value to a merger or acquisition beyond that provided by traditional 
investment banks. 
2.2 Investment vs. Commercial Banks Providing Investment Banking Services 
The debate regarding financial services modernization and the elimination of the Glass-
Steagall Act has fueled a number of academic studies contrasting the roles of investment banks to 
commercial banks.  Similar in flavor, if not in substance, to our study is the literature on the 
potential for conflicts of interest in securities underwriting.   
While the Glass Steagall Act has now been replaced,8 its historic rationale can be traced, 
in part, to concerns that commercial bank underwriters have conflicts of interest that will 
encourage the public issuance of securities in order to reduce their own poor quality loan 
exposures.  In general, empirical evidence has not supported the existence of such a conflict of 
interest.  Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Ang and Richardson (1994), and Puri (1996), among 
others,9 find that the debt securities underwritten by commercial banks prior to Glass-Steagall’s 
passage in 1933, were less likely to default than those underwritten by investment banks.  In 
addition, yields tended to be lower and the credit quality higher for commercial bank-
underwritten issues than for issues underwritten by investment banks.  Moreover, no significant 
difference was found in the performance of the equities underwritten by investment banks during 
                                                 
8 The Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 1999 essentially eliminates the major barriers among banking, securities, and 
insurance activities. 
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the 1920s as opposed to commercial bank affiliates.  Indeed, Puri (1994, 1996) finds evidence of 
a certification role for commercial banks as they enhance their reputations by reusing private 
information obtained in the course of banking relationships.   
More modern (post-1990) evidence based on the limited debt underwriting powers for 
banks in Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997), and equity underwriting powers in Hebb 
(1999) have tended to confirm the earlier evidence of a net certification effect for banks.  
Although the Glass-Steagall Act did not prohibit banks from advising in mergers and 
acquisitions cases, the relevance of certification effects and of potential conflicts of interest, in 
the area of merger advisement, is the central empirical question being investigated in this paper. 
2.3 The Value of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Out of the exhaustive empirical literature on mergers and acquisitions, one result is highly 
robust.  This is the empirical finding that target firms tend to experience positive abnormal 
returns upon merger announcements while acquirers post zero or negative abnormal returns.10  
Thus, targets appear to obtain most of the expected merger and acquisition gains.11   
Target gains stem from many sources. The corporate control hypothesis, studied by 
Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), and Franks and Mayer 
(1996) links merger gains to the reduction in agency costs in the market for corporate control.  
The market power hypothesis stipulates that mergers enhance the competitive position of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
9  See Benston (1990) as well as the citations in footnote 2. 
10 Bank mergers are an exception to this generalization.  For example, James and Weir (1987) find significant 
positive abnormal returns for acquirers in bank mergers.  See Palia (1994) for a survey of empirical studies on bank 
mergers. 
11  Existing literature on the post-merger performance of acquiring firms, however, is divided.  Agrawal, Jaffe, and 
Mandelker (1992) find that stockholders of acquiring firms suffer a 10% loss over the 5-year post-merger period, and 
that neither the firm size effect nor the beta estimation problems are the cause of the negative post-merger returns.  In 
contrast, Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) find significant post-merger increases in operating cash flow returns.  
Linn and Switzer (2001) show that post-merger performance is better for cash financed deals. 
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target [see Beatty et al. (1987) and Berger and Humphrey (1992)].  Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) find evidence of the synergy motive in mergers and acquisitions. Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) find synergistic gains to targets in the creation of internal capital markets within 
conglomerates created by a program of diversifying mergers and acquisitions. 
Whereas targets must receive some expectation of gain in order to win the approval of 
their target shareholders for any merger, those acquirer firm managers, who are unconstrained by 
pressure from value maximizing shareholders, may embark on acquisitions that offer no ex ante 
gain to stockholders.  The managerial risk diversification hypothesis [see Amihud and Lev 
(1981), Amihud and Kamin (1979), and Lloyd, Hand and Modani (1987)] postulates that 
acquiring firm managers undertake (value reducing) mergers in order to reduce their 
undiversifiable human capital investment in their firm.  Evidence of this is shown in Amihud, 
Kamin, and Ronen (1983).   In a European context, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) show that 
diversifying mergers are value reducing, whereas focusing mergers are value enhancing.  In the 
winner’s curse or hubris hypothesis, overly optimistic acquirers overbid for targets.  For 
example, Roll (1986) shows that acquirers who overestimate the value of the target are more 
likely to successfully complete a merger, resulting in a decline in the acquirer’s value to 
stockholders.   
 The question, unexamined prior to this paper, is how the choice of financial advisor 
impacts the distribution of gains between target and acquirer upon the announcement of a 
merger. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology  
3.1 Computing Abnormal Returns for Targets and Acquirers 
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To investigate the net certification role of commercial banks as merger and acquisition 
advisors, we compute standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) to both targets and 
acquirers for a three-day window around the merger announcement date. Our estimates of 3-day 
abnormal returns, denoted (-1,+1), include both the day of the merger announcement,  as well as 
one day before and after.12  We test for the explanatory power of the advisor’s identity, 
controlling for other deal-specific factors.  Even if the advisor’s identity is not publicly revealed 
on the merger announcement date, the market would reward well-designed and attractively-
priced deals without necessarily knowing the advisor’s role in producing the positive results.  
 Our estimation of target and acquirer abnormal returns follows well established 
procedures used in other event studies, such as Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), Bradley, 
Desai, and Kim (1988), and Stulz, Walking and Song (1990). We estimate a single-index model 
using CRSP daily stock returns to compute expected (benchmark) returns.  Specifically, market 
model parameters for both target and acquiring firms are estimated using 190 trading days of 
daily returns data beginning 250 days and ending 60 days before the first announcement of the 
merger.13   
3.2 Controlling for the Identity of the Advisor, Characteristics of Targets and 
Acquirers, and Deal-Specific Factors 
The identity of the bank advisor and the credit/lending relationship14 between the bank 
advisor and target and/or acquirer is defined by four different dummy variables:  TB_BT  takes on 
                                                 
12 We present our results using the standard (-1,+1) window, although analogous results were obtained when using a 
wider (-5,+5) window. 
13  We used the first announcement date for multiple or revised bid deals.  If daily return data were unavailable for 
the full 250 days prior to merger announcement, then the normal estimation period was less than the full 190 days. 
14 A credit/lending relationship exists if the bank has made loans to either merger counterparty at some date prior to 
the merger announcement date. The precise empirical definition of a credit/lending relationship is presented in 
Section 4. 
 13 
the value 1 if the target's advisor is a commercial bank and if the bank advisor had a prior 
relationship with the target;  TB_BA takes on the value 1 if the target's advisor is a commercial 
bank and if the bank advisor had a prior relationship with the acquirer;  AB_BT takes on the value 
1 if the acquirer's advisor is a commercial bank and if the bank advisor had a prior relationship 
with the target;  AB_BA takes on the value 1 if the acquirer's advisor is a commercial bank and if 
the bank advisor had a prior relationship with the acquirer.15  We distinguish between deals 
advised by top tier and mid tier investment banks and those advised by commercial banks 
through the use of the variable DUMBANK, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 for all 
commercial bank advised deals and 0 for deals advised by the investment bank control group.  
The dummy variable TOPTIER denotes all targets and acquirers in our top tier investment bank 
control group that obtain advice from at least one top-tier investment bank (Goldman Sachs, 
Credit Suisse First Boston, Salomon Brothers, or Morgan Stanley Dean Witter).16  The dummy 
variable MIDTIER indicates those deals using only mid tier investment bank advisors such as 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers PaineWebber and Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette (during the 
time periods when these firms were independent).  There were no commercial bank advisors at 
all in the investment bank advisor control groups. 
In our regression analysis, we also control for deal specific variables not related to the 
identity and relationship of the advisors to targets and acquirers.   Several control factors are 
incorporated into the model to capture the impact on abnormal returns resulting from characteristics 
of the target, the acquirer, or the offer.  These control factors are discussed next. 
3.2.1 Control Factors 
                                                 
15 More than one of these variables could take on the value of one for any given observation.  Thus, if TB_BT = 
TB_BA = 1 then the target advisor has had prior lending relationships with both target and acquirer. 
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A robust result in the merger literature is that announcement returns to bidding firms who 
make cash offers are higher than when stock offers are made [see Travlos (1987)], since a bidder 
with private information about the value of its own assets offers stock when its shares are 
overvalued by target shareholders.  Recognizing this adverse selection effect, target shareholders 
reduce their estimate of a bidder’s value. Thus, without some other benefit to target stockholders 
in receiving stock rather than cash as a means of payment, a “lemons problem” arises for stock 
offers.17  The means of payment in a merger and acquisition is incorporated in our model through 
the variable PCTCASH (a variable that reflects the percentage of the deal value that is paid for in 
cash).  Previous studies suggest a positive coefficient on the PCTCASH variable. 
Stulz, Walking, and Song (1990) find that the relationship between a target’s abnormal 
return and the target firm’s ownership structure depends on the relative power of the bidder to 
successfully complete the acquisition without competition from other bidders (i.e., the stronger 
the bidder -- in terms of either lower target management’s ownership stake, larger bidder 
ownership stake, or fewer bidders -- the lower the target’s abnormal returns). Our empirical 
proxy variable for this effect takes the form of BVPREM, which is defined as the initial offer 
price for the target over the target’s book value of equity.  Since a multiple-bidder auction for the 
target tends to offer a relatively large initial acquisition premium, we anticipate a direct 
relationship between BVPREM and target abnormal returns.  This relationship is also consistent 
with Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis.  Following Doukas and Travlos (1988) and Kang (1993), 
who find evidence of positive abnormal returns for international acquisitions, we use a one-zero 
dummy variable denoting whether the deal is a cross-border merger or not (CROSS).  Because 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 These investment banks were chosen to be consistent with Bowers and Miller (1990). 
17  Brown and Ryngaert (1991) shows that taxes should also have important implications for the bidder’s decision 
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integration of larger targets into the acquiring firm is likely to generate agency cost reductions in 
value, we incorporate the control variable RELSIZE, measured as the ratio of the market value of 
equity for the target to the acquirer.  Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) show that as a firm 
becomes more diverse (measured empirically as the deviation in size across all firm subdivisions) 
internal capital may be misallocated within the firm due to inefficiencies as a result of the battle 
between competing divisions for scarce capital resources.  Since integration of a relatively large 
target in the course of a merger is likely to accentuate the internal power struggle over capital 
allocation, we expect a negative relationship between RELSIZE and abnormal returns. 
Cotter and Zenner (1994) document that abnormal returns are lower for hostile compared 
to friendly mergers, controlling for size (market value of equity), ownership factors, and other 
characteristics of the offer (e.g., whether there are multiple bidders and whether the target has a 
golden parachute).  Consequently, we incorporate the variable ATTITUDE  (hostile, neutral, or 
friendly) into our estimation. We also check for robustness using CLOSE (a dummy variable 
denoting whether or not the target is closely held), MGMT (denoting whether the target's 
management participated in the merger), and PROTECT (denoting whether the target firm had 
protective mechanisms such as golden parachutes or poison pills).   The latter variable is also 
suggested by the findings of Comment and Schwert (1995) who showed higher takeover 
premiums for firms with anti-takeover provisions in place. 
Dummy variables indicating the motive for the acquisition are included based on the findings 
of Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), who suggest that synergy is the primary motive in those 
takeovers with positive total gains to both targets and acquirers, and that agency conflicts are the 
primary motive in takeovers with negative gains to both targets and acquirers. Targets may also be 
                                                                                                                                                             
regarding the means of payment, cash versus stock mixes. 
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valuable because of their high profitability (proxied by TPROFIT), growth rate (proxied by 
TGROWTH), or Tobin’s q (measured as the market price to book value of the target firm, TOBINQ). 
 We control for the target firm’s leverage ratio using the variable TLEVER.  Finally, annual (time) 
dummy variables are used to differentiate mergers announced in each year from 1995 to 2000. 
We estimate the following expressions for both targets and acquirers separately: 
SCARi = f (TB_BT, TB_BA, AB_BT, AB_BA, DUMBANK, BVPREM, TGROWTH,            
                     TPROFIT, TLEVER, RELSIZE, DUMCASH, CROSS, ATTITUDE, YEAR) + εi,             
             
 
where SCARi  is the 3-day standardized cumulative abnormal return to target and acquiring firm i 
and all control variables are as defined in Table 1.18   
4. The Data  
Mergers and acquisitions data were obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database.  All mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. target firms over the 
period January 1, 1995 through December 31, 2000 were identified.  We excluded all mergers 
involving financial firms as either target or acquirer.  We formed a subset of deals consisting of 
those merger transactions in which either side of the transaction (target or acquirer) or both list a 
commercial bank or its subsidiary as an advisor.19    We then conducted a Lexis/Nexis search on 
                                                 
18 In order to examine other variables considered in the merger literature, we conducted robustness checks of our model. 
We incorporated a control variable TENDER denoting whether a tender offer had occurred, since it has been established 
that successful tender offers may increase target shareholder wealth [see Jensen and Ruback (1983)].  In addition to the 
control variable PCTCASH, discussed in Section 3.2.1, we focused on several other methods of financing mergers and 
acquisitions.  These included SFC (a dummy variable indicating the issuance of common stock to finance the 
acquisition), SFCORP (a dummy variable indicating the use of internally generated funds), SFDEBT (a dummy variable 
indicating the use of debt), and SWAP (a dummy variable denoting a stock swap).  We also included an ownership 
variable, BLOCK, to denote block shareholdings, MOE (an SDC-designation of “merger of equals”) and the variable 
CASHFLOW to measure free cash flow (computed as cash assets divided by total assets). We included a dummy variable, 
MERGER, for completed target acquisitions (denoted by a value of 1) in contrast to partial acquisitions, spin-offs, or 
split-offs (all denoted as 0). Following Saunders and Srinivasan (2001), a variable FEES controlled for total fees paid by 
both target and acquirer as a percent of transaction value.  None of these variables turned out to be statistically significant 
and we do not present them in our regression results presented in Section 5.2. 
19  Several commercial bank holding companies themselves acquired investment firms during the sample period.  We 
 17 
each of the targets and acquirers to determine whether there was a prior banking relationship with 
any of the bank advisors.  In this search, we examined SEC 10K, 10Q, and 8K filings, as well as 
annual reports, prospectuses, and other registered filings that dated back to January 1990 in order 
to determine whether the bank advisors had any prior credit/lending relationship with either of 
the parties to the merger.20  If the bank advisor was listed in any of the SEC filings of the merger 
parties, we recorded a bank relationship dummy variable of one.21  If there was no mention of the 
bank advisor, but there was a description of other bank relationships, we recorded a bank 
relationship dummy variable of zero.22  If there was any ambiguity in defining the bank 
relationship for either the target or the acquirer, we recorded the relationship as missing.  Using 
this procedure, we constructed the four dummy variables that distinguish among the four possible 
banking relationships: the target's bank advising the target (TB_BT), the acquirer's bank advising 
the target (TB_BA), the target's bank advising the acquirer (AB_BT), and the acquirer's bank 
advising the acquirer (AB_BA).   
To fill in some of the missing bank relationships, we obtained data on loan syndications 
from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC).  If LPC showed that a bank advisor participated in a loan 
syndication in any capacity (i.e., as an agent, arranger, or participant) prior to the merger 
announcement date, then we recorded that as a prior banking relationship.  The LPC database 
included description of the role of the lender, the origination date of the loan syndication, and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
included acquisitions advised by the investment firm as acquisitions advised by commercial banks if the deal was 
announced after the commercial bank acquired the investment firm. For instance, in April 1997 Alex-Brown & 
Company was acquired by Bankers Trust.  Prior to that date, acquisitions advised by Alex-Brown were considered to 
be non-bank advised mergers.  After that date, they were classified as bank advised mergers. 
20 Lexis/Nexis provides prospectuses and registration statements from April 1993 to the present only. 
21  Because the SEC does not require firms to reveal specific details about their banking relationships, we could not 
utilize more detailed data about the nature of the relationship.  Data obtained from Loan Pricing Corporation 
contained more detailed descriptions of the lending relationship.   
22  We therefore avoided the problem of recording no relationship for companies that chose not to report any of their 
banking arrangements. 
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purpose of the loan, among other descriptive variables.  We use these variables to analyze the 
intensity of the lending relationship for the subset of deals that were included in the LPC 
database.23  We also used the more detailed LPC database to define the ACCESS indicator 
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the acquirer’s bank is hired as an advisor and subsequently 
makes a loan to the acquirer up to one or two years after the merger announcement date. 
Our sample includes only those firms whose shares were traded on either NYSE, AMEX, 
or Nasdaq.  In order to obtain a non-merger period, with which to estimate abnormal returns, we 
utilized returns for a full year prior to the start of our merger sample period of January 1995 
through December 2000.  Thus, daily stock returns over the period January 1, 1994 through 
December 31, 2000 were obtained from CRSP.24  We verified the SDC announcement date using 
the Wall Street Journal, and used the date in the Wall Street Journal whenever there was a 
discrepancy. 
Next, we constructed a control sample of deals advised by (1) top tier investment banks, 
defined to be Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Morgan 
Stanley Dean Witter and (2) mid tier investment banks, defined to be Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers, PaineWebber, and Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette (during the time periods when each 
of these firms was independent). Deals were included in the control sample only if there were no 
commercial bank advisors for either the target or the acquirer.  When all financial mergers and 
non-publicly traded companies were excluded, we were left with 189 deals25 in the investment 
                                                 
23 Although LPC focuses on syndicated loans, it also includes some private placements and underwritten debt.  
However, since the SEC filings consider all bank lending relationships, we used the LPC database to fill in the 
missing observations from the more comprehensive Lexis/Nexis. 
24  The CRSP Permanent Number was used to obtain a continuous series of stock return data even if company name, 
ticker, or CUSIP changed. 
25 There were 189 targets and 175 acquirers in the control sample.  The difference in the number of observations 
stems from deals in which there was no advisor chosen by either the target or the acquirer. 
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bank control sample. 
Control variables were constructed from SDC, CRSP and COMPUSTAT.  The tickers for 
each acquirer and target provided by SDC were matched with the CRSP permanent numbers in 
order to obtain daily return data and market capitalization values as of the deal announcement 
date.  Wherever necessary, COMPUSTAT data were used to fill in the values of control variables 
such as TLEVER (target debt/equity ratios) and TPROFIT (target return on assets).  A list of 
definitions of all control variables is shown in Table 1.   
The overall sample (including investment banks and commercial banks as advisors) 
consists of 488 targets and 495 acquirers.26  Table 2 displays key descriptive statistics.27  Targets 
(acquirers) hired bank advisors in 31.4 % (34.3%) of the deals.  Out of the total number of 
mergers, 36.8% of the target advisors had either prior banking relationships with the target 
(22.5%) or the acquirer (14.3%).  Table 2 also shows that 27.9% of the acquirer advisors had 
prior banking relationships with either the target (12.9%) or the acquirer (15%).  The control 
group of top tier and mid tier investment banks advised 38.7% of the targets and 35.4% of the 
acquirers.  Most of the mergers in our sample (62.1%) took place in the years 1998 (23.6%) and 
2000 (38.5%).28  Finally, most deals (93.4%) were classified by SDC as either friendly or neutral. 
 However, average target abnormal returns were significantly (at the 10% level) higher for hostile 
deals (a mean abnormal return of 5.12%) than for friendly/neutral deals (a mean of 3.32%).29 
                                                 
26 There are more targets than acquiring firms because some acquirers are foreign firms that are not traded on either 
NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq.  However, most foreign acquirers are traded on US stock exchanges.  Excluding all 
foreign acquirers would have resulted in the loss of more than 100 observations.  Thus, we control for cross border 
acquisitions in our analysis.   
27 Table 2, Panel C reports descriptive statistics for control variables.  There were 684 observations in the merger 
database, but data availability on CRSP and Compustat limited our final sample to 488 targets and 495 acquirers. 
28 Although the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (permitting investment banks to acquire commercial bank 
subsidiaries) took effect in March 2000, we find no impact on our results for the pre- versus the post-GLBA periods. 
29 We performed pairwise mean difference tests using both the pooled and Satterthwaite methods to control for the 
possibility of unequal variances.  Whenever statistically significant, the results of pairwise mean difference tests are 
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5. Empirical Results 
Consistent with the literature to date, Table 2, Panel A shows that target abnormal returns 
are on average positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (averaging 3.38%), whereas 
acquirer abnormal returns are either negative (on average –0.31% significant at the 1% level) or 
insignificantly different from zero. In particular, the average 3-day (-1,+1) acquirer abnormal 
return of –0.60% is significantly negative (at the 1% level) for deals advised by top tier 
investment banks, suggesting that some of the significantly positive gains to targets may come at 
the expense of acquirers.30  In contrast, acquirer abnormal returns (0.28%) for those deals advised 
by mid tier investment banks are significantly higher (at the 10% level) than for those deals 
advised by either top tier investment banks or commercial banks (3-day acquirer abnormal 
returns average –0.35%).  This result is consistent with the results of Rau (2000) and Hunter and 
Jagtiani (2001) who find that top tier investment banks tend to advise acquirers to pay too much 
for target firms.  
Table 2 Panel A also shows that target abnormal returns over the (-1,+1) period are 
significantly (at the 1% level) positive for all bank advised deals, whereas acquirer abnormal 
returns tend to be either significantly negative or insignificantly different from zero.   
Interestingly, acquirer returns are highest when the acquirer does not use any financial advisor (a 
mean of 0.21% which is significantly higher at the 5% level than the mean acquirer abnormal 
returns when the acquirer uses either a commercial bank or an investment bank as financial 
                                                                                                                                                             
reported in Table 2.  The pair of means to be compared is marked with the same letter in the superscript of the 
standard error reported in Table 2.  The significance level is denoted by a 1 (2) for the 5% (10%) levels. 
30 Acquirer abnormal returns are significantly lower (at the 5% level) for those deals advised by top tier investment 
banks than for those deals advised by either mid tier investment banks or commercial banks which have an average 
abnormal return to the acquirer of –0.19% (significant at the 10% level).  This is consistent with Srinivasan (1999) 
who finds that acquirers pay top tier investment banks significantly higher fees for merger advice, thereby reducing 
acquirer abnormal returns. 
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advisor).  In contrast, the target’s abnormal returns are reduced to a mean of 2.80% when the 
target does not hire a financial advisor.31 
5.1 Target and Acquirer Abnormal Returns Without Controlling for Banking 
Relationships 
The regressions presented in Table 3 examine the 3-day abnormal returns controlling for 
deal characteristics, but not controlling for the existence of prior banking relationships.  
Although we examine all the control variables listed in Table 1, we present the results for only 
the most consistently significant variables in Tables 3-5.  These control variables can be divided 
into two groups: (1) Deal characteristics such as PCTCASH (the percentage of cash used to 
finance the merger), BVPREM (the premium of the price over the target’s book value), 
ATTITUDE (=0 if friendly or neutral, =1 if hostile)32, COMPLETE (=1 if the deal is completed, 0 
otherwise), and CROSS (=1 if the acquirer is a non-US firm, 0 otherwise); and (2) firm 
characteristics such as TGROWTH (the target firm growth rate), TPROFIT (the target firm’s 
return on assets), and TLEVER (the target firms’ long-term debt to equity ratio).  Descriptive 
statistics for these control variables are shown in Panel C of Table 2. 
The regressions presented in column (1) of Table 3 are consistent with the Panel A, Table 
2 finding that the identity of the financial advisor does not have any significant impact on target 
abnormal returns.  That is, the coefficients on the DUMBANK  (=1 if there is at least one 
commercial bank advisor and 0 otherwise) and MIDTIER variables (=1 if all advisors are mid tier 
investment banks and 0 otherwise) are insignificantly different from zero.  However, controlling 
for deal and firm characteristics, the positive and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient on the 
                                                 
31 However, the mean difference is not statistically significant. 
32 We tested the cross product of the ATTITUDE variable with the relationship dummy variables and found no 
 22 
DUMBANK variable in column (2) of Table 3 shows that target abnormal returns are highest for 
mergers advised by commercial banks.  This result suggests that commercial bank financial 
advisors play some role in enhancing target firm abnormal returns.  Moreover, consistent with the 
literature, we find that cash financing has a strong positive impact (significant at the 1%) level on 
target abnormal returns. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that without controlling for prior banking relationships or deal 
characteristics, the average acquirer 3-day abnormal return is significantly lower for deals 
advised by top tier investment banks.  The uncontrolled regression shown in column (3) of Table 
3 is consistent with that finding.  That is, the coefficients on the DUMBANK and MIDTIER 
variables are significantly positive (at the 10% level or better) indicating that acquirer returns are 
higher for deals advised by either commercial bank or mid tier investment bank advisors than for 
the omitted top tier investment bank advisor group.  However, this result is not obtained when 
we control for deal characteristics.  That is, the coefficients on the DUMBANK variable and 
MIDTIER are insignificant in the regressions presented in column (4) in Table 3.   
 The results for the control variables presented in column (4) in Table 3 are consistent 
with previous studies.  Acquirer returns are positively related to PCTCASH (significant at the 1% 
level), and BVPREM (significant at the 5% level) and negatively related to TGROWTH and 
TPROFIT (both significant at the 5% level).  Interestingly, acquirer returns are significantly 
higher (at the 5% level or better) for deals announced in 1995, 1996, 1998, and 1999 as 
compared to the omitted base year of 2000.   
In summary, the results in Table 3 suggest that commercial bank advisors enhance the 
abnormal returns earned by target firms upon merger announcement, but not those of acquirers. 
                                                                                                                                                             
significance. 
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However, the results in Table 3 do not control for prior banking relationships between advisors 
and merger counterparties.  In Section 5.2.1, we examine average abnormal returns for both the 
target and acquirer controlling for prior lending relationships.  In Section 5.2.2, we report results 
of multivariate regressions of lending relationships and control variables on target abnormal 
returns.  In Section 5.2.3, we perform the same multivariate regression analysis, but instead with 
acquirer abnormal returns as the dependent variable.  We summarize our findings on the 
relationship between lending relationships and acquirer and target abnormal returns in Section 
5.2.4. 
 
5.2.1 Mean Target and Acquirer Abnormal Returns Controlling for Banking 
Relationships 
Panel A in Table 2 presents average 3-day abnormal returns for both targets and acquirers 
without controlling for the existence of prior banking relationships between the advisors and the 
merger counterparties.  In Table 2, Panel B, we show how lending relationships impact average 
3-day abnormal returns for targets and acquirers.  The mean target abnormal return for deals in 
which the target advisor has had a prior banking relationship with the target (TB_BT =1) is 
4.25%, significant at the 1% level.  This is significantly higher (at the 10% level) than the mean 
target abnormal return for no prior relationship (i.e., TB_BT=0) mergers of 3.12%, suggesting 
that target firms earn higher abnormal returns if they hire their own commercial bank as advisor.  
Acquirer returns tend to be significantly negative for all relationships.  However, acquirer returns 
are lowest (mean difference significant at the 10% level or above) when both the target and 
acquirer advisors have prior banking relationships.  Moreover, the use of the acquirer’s bank as 
the target’s advisor is the most damaging to the acquirer’s abnormal returns, with a mean of  
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–0.69% which is significantly lower (at the 5% level) than the mean of –0.22% for deals in which 
the target advisor has not had a prior relationship with the acquirer.  This result suggests that the 
target firm’s access to information about the acquirer is potentially damaging to the acquirer in 
merger negotiations. 
Acquirer returns are highest (insignificantly different from zero, rather than significantly 
negative) when the acquirer’s bank is chosen as an advisor that subsequently lends to the acquirer 
either one year after the merger announcement (for a mean of –0.49%, insignificantly different 
from zero) or up to two years after the merger announcement (statistically insignificant mean of –
0.46%).  Thus, the contribution of financial advisors to acquiring firms does not appear to 
emanate from increased abnormal returns obtained in the context of the zero sum merger price 
negotiation.  Rather, these results suggest that acquirers gain when their bank is chosen as an 
advisor because this enhances the likelihood that the advisor will subsequently finance the 
transition period during which the merger is consolidated.33 
5.2.2 Target Abnormal Returns Controlling for Banking Relationships 
Table 4 shows that target abnormal returns are affected by prior banking relationships. 
The narrow regression results presented in Table 4, column (1) show that targets benefit from 
hiring their own banks as advisors in mergers and acquisitions, as denoted by the dummy 
variable TB_BT.   Regressing the four relationship dummies (TB_BT, TB_BA, AB_BT, and 
AB_BA) on target abnormal returns yields a positive coefficient for TB_BT (significant at the 5% 
level). All other relationship dummy variables are statistically insignificant.  Thus, the nature of 
the prior relationship between the bank advisor and its merger counterparty is important in 
                                                 
33 This result may also be consistent with a “double certification” effect, in which the bank certifies the value of the 
deal by both advising the merger and committing to future lending.  However, despite this certification, acquirer 
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determining the size of a target’s abnormal returns.  Further, the addition of control variables 
does not eliminate the impact of bank relationships on a target’s abnormal returns, but rather 
enhances its significance.  In both columns (2) and (3) of Table 4, the TB_BT coefficient remains 
statistically positive and significant at the 1% level when other control variables are added.  
Results for the control variables shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 are consistent 
with the literature that show that cash financed mergers have significantly (at the 1% level) 
higher target abnormal returns, as denoted by the positive coefficients on PCTCASH.  None of 
the other control variables are statistically significant. 
5.2.3 Acquirer Abnormal Returns Controlling for Banking Relationships 
 Table 5 analyzes acquirer abnormal returns controlling for banking relationships.  In the 
narrow regression results shown in column (1) of Table 5 none of the relationship variables is 
significant, but the negative coefficient on the TOPTIER variable (=1 if at least one advisor is a 
top tier investment bank and there are no commercial banks, 0 otherwise) is significant at the 
10% level.  This is consistent with the means presented in Panel A of Table 2 showing that 
average abnormal returns are lowest for the acquirer when the advisors are top tier investment 
banks.  However, although this result holds in column (2) of Table 5 (when control variables are 
added), it is not statistically significant in column (3) of Table 5 when the full set of control 
variables (including year dummy variables) are entered as explanatory variables.   
Table 5 presents some evidence that the gains to targets from hiring their own bank may 
come at the expense of acquirers.  The negative coefficient on TB_BT (significant at the 10% 
level or better) in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 shows that the target’s gain in merger 
negotiations is the acquirer’s loss.  That is, if targets use their banks to certify a higher firm 
                                                                                                                                                             
abnormal returns are still insignificantly different from zero suggesting that the conflict of interest effect dominates. 
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value, then the costs of the acquisition, and therefore the abnormal returns to the acquirer are 
decreased.34     
Introduction of the control variables into columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 indicates that the 
coefficient on PCTCASH is significantly positive (at the 1% level).  All other control variables 
show similar coefficients to the model presented in column (4) of Table 3 with the exception of 
the merger year effect.  Acquirer abnormal returns are highest for mergers announced in 1995 
and 1996 as compared to the base case year 2000, as evident from the significantly positive (at 
the 5% level) coefficients on the D95 and D96 variables.35 
5.2.4 Summary of Tests Assessing the Contribution of Prior Banking Relationships 
to Target and Acquirer Abnormal Returns 
There are two major results that are consistent throughout Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5, as well as 
in other robustness tests not discussed above.36  The first is that target firms earn significantly 
higher abnormal returns upon a merger announcement when they hire their own banks as their 
merger advisor.  We interpret this result as evidence of a bank certification role in merger 
advisement for the more informationally opaque target firms.  That is, the target can negotiate a 
better price if its own bank certifies its value.  
The second major finding is that using commercial banks as advisors appears to play no 
                                                 
34 One possible reason that acquirers may not benefit from prior banking relationships may be that the target advisor 
uses its information asymmetrically to benefit its own client (which is the target), thereby certifying that an acquirer’s 
bid price is too low, but not that it is too high. 
35 The ACCESS control variable (which takes on a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the acquirer’s bank lends to the 
acquirer up to one year after the merger announcement) is insignificant in all models presented in Table 5, because 
the market may not know of these future loans upon merger announcement. 
36We performed robustness tests using all of the control variables presented in Table 1.  Moreover, we tested whether 
the bank advisor’s certification effect was more important for deals that are relatively complex such as those 
involving tender offers or stock swaps.  When we tested this hypothesis by segmenting the sample of commercial 
bank-advised mergers into subsamples of commercial bank-advised deals both with and without tender offers, as 
well as subsamples both with and without stock swaps, we found support for our basic result that targets increase 
their abnormal returns by hiring their own banks as advisors.  
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role in impacting acquirer abnormal returns.  That is, we find no evidence of a certification effect 
for bank advisors that have had prior lending relationships with the acquirer.  However, although 
acquirer abnormal returns are not significantly affected by the existence of a prior banking 
relationship, the acquiring firm is not indifferent to the choice of financial advisor as is discussed 
in the next section.  In Section 5.3, we examine the factors that impact the acquirer’s choice of 
merger advisor. 
 
5.3 The Choice of Financial Advisor 
Up until this point, we have made the implicit assumption that the choice of an advisor is 
exogenous.   However, the identity of the merger advisor may be endogenously determined by 
the intensity of prior banking relationships.  For example, the existence of a prior lending 
relationship proved critical in the choice of financial advisor in the (since abandoned) Enron 
Corporation – Dynegy merger announced in November 2001.  According to the Wall Street 
Journal, November 28, 2001, page C1:37  
JP Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc. have emerged as prominent financiers and 
cheerleaders behind the problem-plagued [Enron-Dynegy merger] transaction, putting 
hundreds of millions of their own money into Enron in hopes of keeping the deal alive. 
...Each bank has commitments outstanding to Enron, in the form of various loans, of 
roughly $700 million to $800 million, according to officials familiar with the matter, and 
roughly half of that is in unsecured debt….Goldman Sachs Group, an investment bank 
that doesn’t traditionally extend large loans to clients, was denied a piece of the merger 
business because it declined to extend the sort of loans that JP Morgan and Citigroup 
provided last week. 
 
 Access to credit appears to be an important motive influencing the choice of merger 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
37 We use the Enron-Dynegy merger (although it is not part of our sample) as an illustration, although it is far from 
the only case.  For example, JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup offered a generous financing package in order to attract 
the merger advisement business of Lucent away from their long-standing investment bankers.  This is an indication 
of a bank conflict of interest documented in Section 5.4. 
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advisor for an acquirer.  Thus, acquirers may prefer to hire commercial bank advisors, 
particularly those with lending relationships (to either of the merger counterparties), because they 
are in a position to make loans to the merged entity.  To examine this further, we test the link 
between choice of merger advisor and lending relationships using a binomial logit model shown 
in Table 6.  The dependent variable S takes on a value of 0 if the merger advisors to both the 
target and the acquirer are either investment banks or commercial banks with no prior lending 
relationships to either merger party and 1 if either the target or the acquirer financial advisor is a 
commercial bank with a prior lending relationship to either of the merger counterparties.38   
 The independent variables in the logit model in Table 6 depict the intensity of the prior 
banking relationship.  We use the Loan Pricing Corporation database (LPC) to measure 
relationship intensity.39   There are three prior relationship intensity variables: LENDER, 
DURATION and PURPOSE.  LENDER takes on three possible values: 2 if LPC records that the 
lender was an agent or arranger of the loan syndication, 1 if LPC records that the lender was only 
a participant in the loan syndication, and 0 if there was no lending relationship.  Thus, the higher 
the value of LENDER, the more intense the prior banking relationship.  We examine the 
LENDER variable for each of the banking relationships (TB_BT, TB_BA, AB_BT, AB_BA) 
independently, i.e., LENDER_TBBA denotes the intensity of the lending relationship between the 
target advisor and the acquiring firm.   
 The second independent variable, DURATION, denotes the time period between the 
                                                 
38 We also tested a disaggregated model (not shown) that examined the target’s choice independently of the 
acquirer’s choice of financial advisor.  We found that there was no significant impact of the prior lending 
relationship on the target’s choice.  This is consistent with the target’s concern with maximizing its abnormal return 
upon merger announcement.  In contrast, the acquirer would be concerned with access to capital to finance the 
integration of the two firms.  We find that the intensity of the prior lending relationship has a significant impact on 
the acquirer’s choice of financial advisor. 
39 Since we have LPC data for only a subset of the database, we estimate the model in Table 6 using 241 
observations. 
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merger announcement date and the origination date of the earliest loan syndication for both the 
target and the acquirer involving each bank advisor (denoted as TB_BT, TB_BA, AB_BT, and 
AB_BA).  Thus, the longer DURATION, the more long-lived the prior banking relationship.  
Finally, PURPOSE is an LPC variable that takes on three possible values: 2 if the loan was made 
for general business purposes, 1 if it was merger related and 0 if there was no loan relationship.  
Since we are interested in the bank’s access to private information about the firm’s activities 
prior to the merger announcement, we hypothesize that the higher the PURPOSE variable, the 
greater the information content generated by the lending relationship.  That is, merger related 
loan syndications tend to have somewhat narrow focus and are of limited duration.  Instead, 
general business lending allows the bank to obtain information about the day to day investment 
and financing activities of the firm.  Finally, we define all three variables LENDER, DURATION 
and PURPOSE for non-advisor banks as well as advisor banks. 
 The results presented in Table 6 confirm the hypothesis that the more intense the prior 
lending relationship, the greater the likelihood that the commercial bank is chosen as financial 
advisor.  Moreover, it is the intensity of the prior lending relationship with the acquirer that 
determines the choice of financial advisor, in contrast to the role of the prior lending relationship 
with the target that generated the certification gains documented in Section 5.2.  That is all three 
variables LENDER, DURATION and PURPOSE are positive and significant (at the 5% level) for 
the AB_BA relationship, suggesting that the more intense the prior relationship between the 
acquiring firm and the acquirer’s bank advisor, the greater the likelihood that a commercial bank 
will be chosen as merger advisor.  The only other relationship variable that is statistically 
significant (at the 10% level or better) is the LENDER variable for all possible banking 
relationships TB_BT, TB_BA, and AB_BT.  This suggests that the more lending relationships that 
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exist for both target and acquirer, the more likely they are to choose a commercial bank advisor.  
Finally, we examine the merger counterparties’ lending relationships with banks not chosen as 
merger advisors and denote them Nonadvisor in Table 6.  We find that most Nonadvisor 
variables are insignificant, with the exception of Nonadvisor Purpose_A, which denotes the 
relationship between the acquirer and nonadvisor commercial banks.  The more that the acquirer 
has borrowed for general business purposes prior to the merger announcement date, the greater 
the likelihood that a commercial bank advisor will be chosen. 
Although the LENDER, DURATION and PURPOSE variables measure the intensity of 
prior banking relationships, the existence of past lending does not necessarily guarantee future 
lending by the bank advisor.  To address this issue, we constructed another dummy variable, 
ACCESS.  This variable takes on a value of 1 (0 otherwise) if the acquirer’s bank is chosen as a 
financial advisor (by either the target or the acquirer) and the bank lends to the acquirer at any 
time up to one year after the merger announcement date.40  Table 6 shows that the coefficient on 
this variable is positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating that the access to financing in 
the future offered by commercial banks with prior lending relationships increases the likelihood 
that a commercial bank is chosen to advise the merger counterparties.41  These positive results on 
the ACCESS variable were robust for different specifications of the logit model.  The model’s 
chi-square likelihood ratio test for goodness of fit was 87.8818, significant at the 1% level.  Thus, 
we conclude that the relationship between the commercial bank advisor and the acquiring firm 
                                                 
40 We also tested a two year ACCESS variable (=1 if there was a loan to the acquirer within two years after the 
merger announcement) and obtained the same results as reported in Table 6. 
41 The ACCESS variable is included in the acquirer abnormal return regressions presented in Table 5.  The 
coefficient is insignificant, perhaps because the market was unaware on the merger announcement date that the 
financing would take place in the future. 
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primarily impacts the acquirer’s access to credit rather than the acquirer’s abnormal returns.42 
 
 
5.4 Bank Advisor Abnormal Returns 
In Section 5.2, we found evidence of a bank certification effect in which banks that had 
prior lending relationships with target firms used their private information to enhance target 
abnormal returns.  In Section 5.3, we found that acquirers, in contrast to targets, are primarily 
concerned about access to credit at and after the merger announcement date.  Thus, whenever 
possible, targets hire their own banks as merger advisors in order to maximize their abnormal 
returns, whereas acquirers hire their own banks as merger advisors in order to maximize the 
likelihood that financing will be forthcoming.43  This may or may not be consistent with value 
maximization goals.  In this section, we examine the impact of prior banking relationships on 
bank advisor abnormal returns. 
We estimate the market model over the period January 1, 1995 through December 31, 
200044 for the eight (publicly traded) commercial bank advisors most active in our sample: 
Citicorp (before Travelers), Citigroup, FleetBoston, BankBoston (before Fleet), Bankers Trust 
(before Deutschebank), Chase Manhattan (before JP Morgan),  JP Morgan (before Chase), and 
Bank of America (including Nationsbank).  We estimate a pooled return generating model for all 
                                                 
42 Note that the acquirer is not necessarily constrained to follow value-maximizing policies if agency problems 
permit management to pursue value-reducing mergers.  See discussion in Section 2.3. 
43 Of course, this may not be possible if the target or acquirer bank does not offer merger advisement services.  Since 
smaller firms gravitate to smaller banks [see Berger and Udell (1995)] that are less likely to offer this service, this is 
more likely to be a constraint for targets than for acquirers. 
44 We used all bank advisors in our sample that were publicly traded on either NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq for any 
length of time during our sample period.  Thus, we include banks that are no longer in existence such as JP Morgan 
Bank and BankBoston. 
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eight bank advisor returns using a single market index (the CRSP equally weighted index) 45 and 
a dummy variable EVENT PERIOD that takes on a value of 1 for each day before, on, and after a 
merger announcement in which the bank serves as advisor to either counterparty (i.e., we define a 
3-day event window corresponding to the (-1,+1) event period).  Control variables such as SIZE, 
RELSIZE and ACCESS were used. 
Table 7 shows that the impact of prior banking relationships on bank advisor abnormal 
returns is evaluated using two different approaches.  First, we utilize the bank relationship 
dummy variables, TB_BT, TB_BA, AB_BT, AB_BA, to estimate the bank advisors’ abnormal 
returns upon merger announcement for deals with various prior lending relationships.  All 
relationships are insignificant, with the exception of AB_BA that has a negative coefficient, 
significant at the 5% level.  However, AB_BA denotes that the acquirer’s advisor is a bank with a 
prior relationship with the acquirer, but does not specify which bank is that advisor.  Thus, we 
add two dummy variables DTARADV ( DACQADV) which take on a value of 1 if the dependent 
variable bank is the target’s (acquirer’s) advisor.  The negative coefficient in column (1) of Table 
7 (significant at the 5%) level shows that bank abnormal returns decline significantly when the 
bank provides merger advice to acquirers with whom they have had a prior banking 
relationship.46 
This result is robust across all model specifications.  For example, in column (2) of Table 
7 we explicitly define the bank’s relationship to both the target and acquirer.  For example, the 
coefficient on the TB_BT x DTARADV variable denotes the impact on bank abnormal returns of 
                                                 
45 We also estimated a disaggregated return generating function that allowed the betas to vary across banks.  We do 
not present those results since they are quite similar to those presented in Table 7.  We were unable to estimate a 
SUR simultaneous equations model because the estimation period varied across bank advisors. 
46 The abnormal return to the bank of advising its own customer in an acquisition is the sum of the coefficients on 
AB_BA and DACQADV, or –0.0121 for an average decline in bank advisor abnormal returns of 1.21%. 
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advising the target in a merger if the bank has had a prior banking relationship with the target.  
Thus, the negative coefficient on AB_BA x DACQADV (significant at the 1% level) indicates that 
bank abnormal returns significantly decline if the bank offers merger advice to an acquirer with 
which the bank has had a prior banking relationship.  The market, overall, penalizes a bank for 
advising its own customer in a merger if that bank customer is an acquirer. 
This result can be understood by recalling that the acquirer’s incentive to hire its own 
commercial bank as merger advisor was access to credit (see Section 5.3).  The market is 
concerned about a potential conflict of interest as commercial bank advisors continue lending to 
acquirers in return for merger advisory fees.  The advisor’s implicit (or explicit) promise to 
provide credit is viewed as a potential conflict of interest by the market and weakens any 
perceived profits resulting from merger advisory fees; i.e., losses on future loan commitments (as 
well as related adverse reputational effects) may more than offset merger advisory fees.  Using 
the Enron-Dynegy merger as an example, from the Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2001, 
page C15: 
JP Morgan and Citigroup, who have served as the top underwriters of [Enron’s] debt, 
would rather avoid being blamed for letting Enron’s debt go bad.  Even more importantly, 
they also hold their own portion of that debt.  Thus, both banks recently provided an 
additional credit line to Enron totaling $1 billion….[S]peaking privately, bankers concede 
that a failure of the Enron deal would smart beyond what the damage might be to the 
banks’ loan portfolio.  ‘If it falls apart,’ says Mr. Hayes, the Harvard professor, ‘it will be 
a source of embarrassment.’ 
 
Of course, the Enron-Dynegy deal did subsequently fall apart in November 2001, thereby 
validating the market’s concerns about bank conflicts of interest when banks provide merger 
advice to their own clients in the course of an acquisition.  Indeed, on the day after the 
announcement of the Enron bankruptcy filing, Citigroup’s stock price declined more than 2% and 
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JP Morgan Chase’s stock price fell by more than 3%. 
6. Conclusions 
 This paper examines the role of commercial banks as advisors to merger participants.  If 
the role of a financial advisor in a merger is to mobilize information, then commercial banks 
potentially have a comparative advantage in advising their banking customers as compared to 
non-bank advisors (i.e., traditional investment banks).   We refer to this as the bank certification 
effect.  All else being equal, we would expect that access to information generated in the course 
of a lending/credit relationship would enhance the merger counterparty’s abnormal return upon 
announcement of a merger.  However, there is a countervailing influence to the certification 
effect in that the commercial bank may be faced with a conflict of interest that diminishes the 
value of any such certification effect.  In particular, the bank may be unable to credibly relay 
information to the market and investors at large if there is concern that the bank’s merger advice 
is clouded by other objectives, such as the repayment of outstanding loans and potential profits 
from future lending activity.  Alternatively, the bank’s lending decisions may be distorted by the 
bank’s desire to capture merger advisory fees.  Whichever effect predominates determines 
whether using commercial bank advisors increases or decreases acquirer’s and/or target’s 
abnormal returns in mergers and acquisitions.   
We examine empirically this issue using a sample of 488 merger deals announced during 
the time period from January 1, 1995 through December 31, 2000.  Of these sampled mergers, 
299 utilize one or more commercial bank advisors who advise either the target, or the acquirer, or 
both.  The other 189 sampled merger deals constitute our investment bank control group in which 
there are no commercial bank advisors, and both the target and the acquirer hire either top tier or 
mid tier investment bank advisors.   
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We find evidence of a bank certification effect for target firms only.  This certification 
effect takes the form of increased abnormal returns to targets whenever their merger advisor is 
their own bank (with whom the target has had a prior banking relationship).  In contrast, acquirer 
abnormal returns are either negative or insignificantly different from zero in all cases.  Moreover, 
acquirers appear to utilize prior lending relationships to direct their choice of advisor.  The more 
intense the prior banking relationship between the acquirer and the bank, the more likely it is that 
that bank will be chosen to advise the acquiring firm in a merger.  This is because the acquirer 
extracts implicit or explicit commitments regarding access to bank loans in the future post-
merger period.  This creates a potential conflict of interest, which is priced by the market in the 
form of a significantly negative impact on bank abnormal returns upon announcement of a 
merger in which the acquirer’s advisor is the acquirer’s bank.
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Table 1. Definition of Variables 
 
TB_BT Dummy variable =1 if the target’s advisor is a bank which has a prior banking relationship with the 
target; 0 otherwise. 
TB_BA Dummy variable =1 if the target’s advisor is a bank which has a prior banking relationship with the 
acquirer; 0 otherwise. 
AB_BT Dummy variable =1 if the acquirer’s advisor is a bank which has a prior banking relationship with 
the target; 0 otherwise. 
AB_BA Dummy variable =1 if the acquirer’s advisor is a bank which has a prior banking relationship with 
the acquirer; 0 otherwise. 
TOPTIER Dummy variable =1 if at least one advisor is a commercial bank; =0 if there is at least one top tier 
investment bank  (i.e., Goldman Sachs, CSFB, Salomon, or MSDW) advising target/acquirer, and no 
commercial bank advisors. 
MIDTIER Dummy variable =1 if all advisors are mid tier investment banks  (i.e., Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers, Lazard Freres, Paine Webber, etc.), and no commercial bank advisors. 
PCTCASH Percentage of cash used to finance the deal (percent). 
BVPREM Offering premium over target’s book value (market price/book value in percent). 
ATTITUDE Dummy variable=1 if the deal is friendly; 0 if it is neutral; -1 if it is hostile (as designated by SDC). 
CROSS Dummy variable=1 if the merger crossed borders; 0 if not. 
TGROWTH Target firm growth rate (as measured by the 1-3 year annualized percent growth rate in either cash 
flows or earnings per share, whenever available) 
TPROFIT Target firm return on assets (pretax income/total assets in percent). 
TLEVER Target firm leverage (ratio of target long-term debt shareholders equity in percent). 
COMPLETE Dummy variable=1 if completed deal; 0 otherwise. 
RELSIZE Relative firm size (target firm market cap/acquirer market cap as of merger announcement date in 
percent). 
ACCESS Dummy variable=1 if the acquirer’s bank is hired as an advisor and lends to the acquirer up to 1 year 
after the announcement date; 0 otherwise. 
 
ROBUSTNESS VARIABLES 
 
MERGER Dummy variable=1 if the merger is for complete target acquisitions; =0 if partial acquisition.  
PROTECT Dummy variable=1 if there are protective mechanisms such as poison pills, defensive 
recapitalization, scorched earth defenses, etc. 
SFC, SFCORP, 
SFDEBT, SWAP 
Dummy variable=1 if financing includes corporate stock (SFC), internal funds (SFCORP), debt 
(SFDEBT), SWAP (stock swap). 
CASHFLOW Target Firm value minus cash assets divided by total assets (percent). 
FEES Total fees paid to target and acquirer advisors. 
CLOSE Dummy variable=1 if the target was closely held; 0 if not. 
TOBINQ The target firm’s market price divided by book value four weeks prior to merger announcement date 
(percent). 
MGMT Dummy variable=1 if the target’s management was involved in the merger 
BLOCK Dummy variable=1 if the target has block holdings of stock; 0 otherwise 
TENDER Dummy variable=1 if there was a tender offer; 0 otherwise 
MOE Dummy variable=1 if the merger was a merger of equals; 0 otherwise 
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Table 2. Panel A: Overall Descriptive Statistics 
(-1,+1) Target SCAR (-1,+1) Acquirer SCAR 
Control Variable Control Variable 
Control Variables 
NO=0 YES=1 NO=0 YES=1 
All Observations  488 deals 
3.38%*** 
 495 deals 
-0.31%*** 
Target advisor is a bank.  294 deals 
3.31%*** 
153 deals 
3.67%*** 
269 deals 
-0.46%*** 
170 deals 
-0.14% 
Acquirer advisor is a bank.  252 deals 
3.57%*** 
168 deals 
3.30%*** 
243 deals 
-0.42%***1A 
172 deals 
-0.39%***1B 
The target firm does not use a 
financial advisor.  
 41 deals 
2.80%*** 
 56 deals 
-0.13% 
The acquirer does not use a 
financial advisor.  
 68 deals 
2.89%*** 
 80 deals 
0.21%1A,1B 
Both advisors are top tier 
investment banks.  
330 deals 
3.49%*** 
158 deals 
3.15%*** 
352 deals 
-0.19%*1C 
143 deals 
-0.60%***1C 
Both advisors are mid tier 
investment banks. 
457 deals 
3.43%*** 
31 deals 
2.63%*** 
463 deals 
-0.35%***2D 
32 deals 
0.28%2D 
Deal attitude: =0 if friendly or 
neutral; =1 if hostile. 
456 deals 
3.32%***2E 
20 deals 
5.12%***2E 
466 deals 
-0.31%*** 
18 deals 
-0.42% 
Year = 1995  23 deals 
2.83%*** 
 29 deals 
0.77%** 
Year = 1996  28 deals 
4.66%*** 
 27 deals 
0.51% 
Year = 1997  73 deals 
2.59%*** 
 71 deals 
-0.39%* 
Year = 1998  115 deals 
3.57%*** 
 121 deals 
-0.26% 
Year = 1999  61 deals 
2.37%*** 
 86 deals 
0.19% 
Year = 2000  188 deals 
3.78%*** 
 161 deals 
-0.92%*** 
 
(Table 2 continued) 
 
Notes: Means were not estimated for the empty cells.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, *** 
denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively, testing whether the mean equals 
zero. 
Whenever statistically significant, mean differences are reported.  The significance levels of each 
pair of means (denoted by the same letter in the superscript of the standard error) are: 
1Mean differences are significant at the 5% level. 
2Mean differences are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2 Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Controlled for Banking Relationships 
(-1,+1) Target SCAR (-1,+1) Acquirer SCAR 
Control Variable Control Variable 
Control Variables 
NO=0 YES=1 NO=0 YES=1 
Target advisor is a bank with a prior 
relationship with the target (TB_BT) 
374 deals 
3.12%***2F 
110 deals 
4.25%***2F 
392 deals 
-0.24%*** 
98 deals 
-0.58%** 
Target advisor is a bank with a prior 
relationship with the acquirer (TB_BA) 
391 deals 
3.22%*** 
70 deals 
3.41%*** 
397 deals 
-0.22%**1G 
85 deals 
-0.69%***1G 
Acquirer advisor is a bank with a prior 
relationship with target (AB_BT) 
419 deals 
3.36%*** 
63 deals 
3.20%*** 
438 deals 
-0.28%*** 
51 deals 
-0.61%** 
Acquirer advisor is a bank with a prior 
relationship with acquirer (AB_BA) 
 
386 deals 
3.18%*** 
73 deals 
3.34%*** 
397 deals 
-0.29%*** 
84 deals 
-0.36%* 
 
Acquirer’s bank lends to acquiring firm up to 1 
year after deal announcement. 
 
456 deals 
3.44%*** 
 
32 deals 
2.62%*** 
 
461 deals 
-0.30%*** 
 
34 deals 
-0.49% 
 
Acquirer’s bank lends to acquiring firm up to 2 
yrs after deal announcement.  
 
 
452 deals 
3.44%*** 
 
36 deals 
2.59%*** 
 
454 deals 
-0.30%*** 
 
41 deals 
-0.46% 
 
Both acquirer and target advisors are either non-
banks or banks without any prior relationships. 
  
245 deals 
3.50%*** 
  
232 deals 
-0.45%***2H 
Acquirer advisor is a non-bank or bank without 
any prior relationship; target advisor has 
relationship with either target or acquirer. 
 42 deals 
3.79%*** 
 30 deals 
-0.36%2J 
Target advisor is a non-bank or bank without 
any prior relationship; acquirer advisor has 
relationship with either target or acquirer. 
 60 deals 
2.69%*** 
 66 deals 
-0.33%1K 
Both target and acquirer advisors have prior 
banking relationships. 
 
 7 deals 
2.83%** 
 9 deals 
-1.16%1K,2H,2J 
 
(Table 2 continued) 
 
Notes: Means were not estimated for the empty cells.  Standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, *** 
denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively, testing whether the mean equals 
zero. 
Whenever statistically significant, mean differences are reported.  The significance levels of each 
pair of means (denoted by the same letter in the superscript of the standard error) are: 
1Mean differences are significant at the 5% level. 
2Mean differences are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2 Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
 
Control 
Variables 
Variable Description N Mean 
(Std) 
Minimum Maximum 
BVPREM Premium of offer price 
over target book value. 
448 4.74*** 
(6.66) 
0.09 63.73 
TGROWTH Target firm growth rate.  
386 
155.14*** 
(540.95) 
 
-48.10 
 
4576.06 
TPROFIT Target ROA  
389 
-5.66*** 
(34.71) 
 
-263.76 
 
48.50 
TLEVER Target Debt/Equity1  
387 
59.75*** 
(186.40) 
 
-648.68 
 
2182.72 
PCTCASH Percent cash financing 681 38*** 
(45) 
0 100 
ATTITUDE Hostile= -1, Friendly=1, 
Neutral=0 
669 0.93*** 
(0.36) 
-1 1 
COMPLETE Completed deals=1 684 0.78*** 
(0.41) 
0 1 
CROSS 1 if non US acquirer 684 0.15*** 
(0.36) 
0 1 
RELSIZE Target market cap over 
acquirer market cap  
403 54.91*** 
(91.89) 
0.07 966.60 
 
Notes: *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
1The variable TLEVER obtained from Compustat is long-term debt divided by total common 
equity.  Common equity is defined as common stock outstanding (including stock adjustments) + 
capital surplus + retained earnings + treasury stock adjustments for common and nonredeemable 
preferred stock.  The value is negative for distressed firms (15 target firms in our sample). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
 
Table 3. Target and Acquirer Abnormal Returns  
Without Controlling for Banking Relationships 
 Target (-1,+1) SCAR Acquirer (-1,+1) SCAR 
Variable Definition (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept Regression constant 3.1531*** (0.4258) 
2.1163* 
(1.1027) 
-0.6028*** 
(0.1614) 
-1.8384*** 
(0.4242) 
DUMBANK Dummy indicator for commercial 
bank advisor 
0.4288 
(0.5264) 
1.7695** 
(0.7029) 
0.3639* 
(0.1942) 
-0.0465 
(0.2707) 
MIDTIER Dummy indicator for mid tier advisor investment banks 
-0.5259 
(1.0514) 
1.6054 
(1.3996) 
0.8865** 
(0.3775) 
0.1666 
(0.5199) 
BVPREM Premium over Book value  -0.0586 (0.0546) 
 0.0429** 
(0.0200) 
TGROWTH Target firm growth rate  -0.0004 (0.0005) 
 -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
TPROFIT Target ROA  0.0183 (0.0121) 
 -0.0089** 
(0.0042) 
TLEVER Target leverage  0.0003 (0.0020) 
 -0.0009 
(0.0008) 
PCTCASH Cash financing  0.0292*** (0.0071) 
 0.0099*** 
(0.0027) 
CROSS Cross border  0.7235 (0.7780) 
 0.3103 
(0.4279) 
ATTITUDE Hostile-friendly  0.2605 (0.7028) 
 0.2710 
(0.2545) 
COMPLETE Indicator of deal completion  -0.4077 (0.8436) 
 0.1882 
(0.3235) 
D95 Dummy for 1995  -1.1847 (1.4984) 
 1.5502*** 
(0.5588) 
D96 Dummy for 1996  -1.5675 (1.5618) 
 1.5829*** 
(0.6091) 
D97 Dummy for 1997  -1.2442 (0.9346) 
 0.5975* 
(0.3474) 
D98 Dummy for 1998  -0.7994 (0.8455) 
 0.7572** 
(0.3265) 
D99 Dummy for 1999  -2.0628* (1.1757) 
 1.0048** 
(0.4407) 
R2  
Adjusted R2 
  0.27% 
-0.14% 
 
13.01% 
8.61% 
 
1.35% 
0.95% 
 
15.94% 
10.48% 
Number of  
Observations 
  487 
 
311 
 
394 
 
246 
 
Notes: *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
 45 
TABLE 4. Dependent Variable: Target 3-Day Abnormal Returns 
Variable Definition Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Intercept Regression constant 3.1299*** (0.4040) 
2.0783* 
(1.0704) 
2.8866** 
(1.2735) 
TB_BT Target bank is target advisor 1.3796** (0.6777) 
2.4130*** 
(0.7931) 
2.2708*** 
(0.8239) 
TB_BA Acquirer bank is target advisor -0.5331 (0.7691) 
-1.2349 
(0.8868) 
-1.3383 
(0.8968) 
AB_BT Target bank is acquirer advisor -0.5772 (0.8152) 
-1.7233* 
(0.9461) 
-1.8472* 
(0.9588) 
AB_BA Acquirer bank is acquirer advisor 0.2990 (0.7521) 
0.8484 
(0.8739) 
0.8157 
(0.8918) 
MIDTIER Only mid tier nonbank advisor -0.5027 (1.0277) 
-0.0430 
(1.2039) 
0.2202 
(1.2767) 
TOPTIER Top tier nonbank advisor -0.2545 (0.5552) 
-0.7040 
(0.6320) 
-1.0940 
(0.7978) 
BVPREM Premium over Book value  -0.0542 (0.0566) 
-0.0509 
(0.0574) 
TGROWTH Target firm growth rate  -0.0003 (0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0005) 
TPROFIT Target ROA  0.0185 (0.0120) 
0.0185 
(0.0121) 
TLEVER Target leverage  0.0003 (0.0021) 
0.0007 
(0.0021) 
PCTCASH Percentage cash financing  0.0253*** (0.0072) 
0.0253*** 
(0.0073) 
CROSS Cross border  0.3969 (0.8597) 
0.2923 
(0.8804) 
ATTITUDE Hostile-friendly  0.5430 (0.6840) 
0.4273 
(0.7172) 
COMPLETE Indicator of deal completion  -0.1518 (0.8141) 
-0.3076 
(0.8560) 
D95 Dummy for 1995    -0.6117 (1.4849) 
D96 Dummy for 1996    -1.4170 (1.5458) 
D97 Dummy for 1997   -0.6226 (0.9748) 
D98 Dummy for 1998   -0.3700 (0.9307) 
D99 Dummy for 1999   -1.5446 (1.2320) 
R2  
Adjusted R2 
 1.18% (-0.14%) 
12.83% 
(8.35%) 
13.55% 
(7.40%) 
Number of 
Observations 
 457 286 286 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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TABLE 5.  Dependent Variable: Acquirer 3-Day Abnormal Returns 
Variable Definition Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Intercept Regression constant -0.7822 (0.1407) 
-0.9190** 
(0.4323) 
-1.4250*** 
(0.4904) 
TB_BT Target bank is target advisor -0.1312 (0.2550) 
-0.6348** 
(0.3152) 
-0.5641* 
(0.3237) 
TB_BA Acquirer bank is target advisor -0.4058 (0.2701) 
-0.2457 
(0.3443) 
-0.1412 
(0.3460) 
AB_BT Target bank is acquirer advisor -0.2455 (0.3373) 
-0.2912 
(0.3824) 
-0.2139 
(0.3838) 
AB_BA Acquirer bank is acquirer advisor -0.0245 (0.2935) 
-0.3537 
(0.3355) 
-0.2646 
(0.3419) 
MIDTIER Only mid tier nonbank advisor 0.3620 (0.3719) 
0.4139 
(0.4576) 
-0.0152 
(0.4858) 
TOPTIER Top tier nonbank advisor -0.3961* (0.2060) 
-0.5229** 
(0.2542) 
-0.2539 
(0.3107) 
ACCESS Acquirer’s bank lends 1 year after 
merger 
-0.0833 
(0.3831) 
0.2569 
(0.4794) 
0.1491 
(0.4880) 
BVPREM Premium over Book value  0.0585*** (0.0219) 
0.0581*** 
(0.0220) 
TGROWTH Target firm growth rate  -0.0004** (0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
TPROFIT Target ROA  -0.0082* (0.0043) 
-0.0083* 
(0.0043) 
TLEVER Target leverage  -0.0003 (0.0008) 
-0.0006 
(0.0008) 
PCTCASH Percentage cash financing  0.0107*** (0.0029) 
0.0110*** 
(0.0028) 
CROSS Cross border  0.5511 (0.5245) 
0.6693 
(0.5264) 
ATTITUDE Hostile-friendly  0.0214 (0.2656) 
0.1500 
(0.2709) 
COMPLETE Indicator of deal completion  0.2656 (0.3297) 
0.2275 
(0.3366) 
D95 Dummy for 1995    1.3831** (0.5700) 
D96 Dummy for 1996    1.2760** (0.6264) 
D97 Dummy for 1997   0.2967 (0.3762) 
D98 Dummy for 1998   0.4159 (0.3677) 
D99 Dummy for 1999   0.7165 (0.4718) 
R2  
Adjusted R2 
 2.30%  
0.85% 
16.08% 
 
10.36% 
19.46% 
 
11.97% 
Number of 
Observations 
  479 
 
235 
 
235 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Standard are errors in 
parentheses. 
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TABLE 6.  Binomial Logit Model for Advisor Choice 
 
The dependent variable is an advisor selection indicator variable S such that: 
S = 0 if the target and the acquirer use either nonbank advisors or banks with no prior relationships with 
either merger counterparty; and 
S = 1 if either the target or the acquirer uses a bank advisor with a prior lending relationship with either the 
target or the acquirer. 
 
In model (1), the independent variables are: 
Lender_TBBT (Lender_ABBT) = 0 if the target firm has no banking relationships with the target 
(acquirer) advisor; =1 if the target’s bank acted as a participant in a loan syndication to the target 
(acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date; =2 if the target’s bank acted as an agent or arranger 
for a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date. 
Lender_TBBA (Lender_ABBA) = 0 if the acquirer has no banking relationships with the target (acquirer) 
advisors; =1 if the acquirer’s bank acted as a participant in a loan syndication to the target (acquiring) firm 
prior to the deal announcement date; =2 if the acquirer’s bank acted as an agent or arranger for a loan 
syndication to the target (acquiring) firm prior to the deal announcement date. 
 
Duration_TBBT (Duration_ABBT) = the length of time (in years) between the origination of the earliest 
loan syndication to the target by the target (acquirer) advisor. 
Duration_TBBA (Duration_ABBA) = the length of time (in years) between the origination of the earliest 
loan syndication to the acquirer by the target (acquirer) advisor. 
 
Purpose_TBBT (Purpose_ABBT) = 0 if there were no prior loan syndications to the target firm involving 
the target (acquirer) advisor; =1 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) advisor to the 
target firm was related to an acquisition; = 2 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) 
advisor to the target firm was for general business purposes. 
Purpose_TBBT (Purpose_ABBT) = 0 if there were no prior loan syndications to the target firm involving 
the target (acquirer) advisor; =1 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) advisor to the 
target firm was related to an acquisition; = 2 if the purpose of the loan syndication by the target (acquirer) 
advisor to the target firm was for general business purposes. 
 
Nonadvisor Lender_T (Nonadvisor Lender_A) = 0 if there were no loan syndications involving 
nonadvisors to the target (acquirer); =1 if the highest level of participation by any nonadvisor in a loan 
syndication to the target (acquirer) was as a participant; =2 if the highest level of participation by any 
nonadvisor in a loan syndication to the target (acquirer) was as an agent or arranger. 
Nonadvisor Duration_T (Nonadvisor Duration_A) = the length of time between the merger 
announcement date and the earliest loan syndication involving a bank that advises neither the target nor the 
acquirer. 
Nonadvisor Purpose_T (Nonadvisor Purpose_A) = 0 if there were no loan syndications involving 
nonadvisors to the target (acquirer); =1 if the purpose of the loan syndication by any nonadvisor to the 
target (acquirer) was related to an acquisition; =2 if the purpose of the loan syndication by any nonadvisor 
to the target (acquirer) was for general business purposes. 
 
Access =1 (0 otherwise) if the acquirer’s bank is chosen as an advisor and subsequently lends to the 
acquirer up to one year after the merger announcement date. 
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Table 6 
 
Independent  Variable 
 
Definition Coefficients 
Intercept Regression constant -1.3423*** 
(0.3421) 
Lender_TBBT Intensity of loan syndication relationship of 
target bank advisor with target 
1.7868*** 
(0.6154) 
Lender_ABBT Intensity of loan syndication relationship of 
target bank advisor with acquirer 
1.3636** 
(0.6096) 
Lender_TBBA Intensity of loan syndication relationship of 
acquirer bank advisor with target 
0.9442* 
(0.5700) 
Lender_ABBA Intensity of loan syndication relationship of 
acquirer bank advisor with acquirer 
1.2949** 
(0.5103) 
Duration_TBBT Duration of syndicated loan given by target bank 
advisor to target 
-0.2069 
(0.1492) 
Duration_ABBT Duration of syndicated loan given by target bank 
advisor to acquirer 
-0.0168 
(0.1279) 
Duration_TBBA Duration of syndicated loan given by acquirer 
bank advisor to target 
0.3273 
(0.2197) 
Duration_ABBA Duration of syndicated loan given by acquirer 
bank advisor to acquirer 
0.2301** 
(0.1048) 
Purpose_TBBT Purpose of syndicated loan given by target bank 
advisor to target 
0.3371 
(0.6816) 
Purpose_ABBT Purpose of syndicated loan given by target bank 
advisor to acquirer 
0.6672 
(0.7353) 
Purpose_TBBA Purpose of syndicated loan given by acquirer bank advisor to target 
0.5528 
(0.6943) 
Purpose_ABBA Purpose of syndicated loan given by acquirer bank advisor to acquirer 
1.2217** 
(0.6202) 
Access Acquirer’s bank advisor and lends to the acquirer up to one year after the merger. 
1.3243** 
(0.6578) 
Nonadvisor Lender_T Intensity of loan syndication relationship of  nonadvisor banks with target 
-0.1594 
(0.6677) 
Nonadvisor Lender_A Intensity of loan syndication relationship of  nonadvisor banks with acquirer 
-0.6871 
(0.6362) 
Nonadvisor Duration_T Duration of syndicated loan given by nonadvisor banks to target 
0.1252 
(0.1584) 
Nonadvisor Duration_A Duration of syndicated loan given by nonadvisor banks to target 
0.0308 
(0.1789) 
Nonadvisor Purpose_A Purpose of syndicated loan given by nonadvisor banks to target 
0.2085 
(0.7403) 
Nonadvisor Purpose_A Purpose of syndicated loan given by nonadvisor banks to acquirer 
1.3854** 
(0.6977) 
Number of observations  241 
Concordant ratio (percent)  84.1 
Likelihood ratio test  87.8*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7. Bank Advisor Abnormal Returns 
 
The pooled return generating function was estimated for 8 bank advisors over the period January 
2, 1995 through December 31, 2000 (or whatever subset of the period was relevant for each 
bank).  Our sample of bank advisors includes Citicorp (before merger with Travelers), 
FleetBoston, Chase Manhattan Bank, JP Morgan Bank (before merger with Chase), Bankers 
Trust (before takeover by Deutschebank), BankBoston (before merger with Fleet), Bank of 
America (including Nationsbank), Citigroup (after merger with Travelers). 
 
The dependent variable is the percent daily return (including dividends) on the 8 bank advisors. 
 
The independent variables are: 
TB_BT (AB_BT) =1 if the target’s (acquirer’s) advisor had a prior banking relationship with the 
target. 
TB_BA (AB_BA) =1 if the target’s (acquirer’s) advisor had a prior banking relationship with the 
acquirer. 
 
DTARADV (DACQADV) =1 if the bank advised the target (acquirer) in the merger. 
MARKET = the daily CRSP equally weighted index. 
EVENT PERIOD = 1 on each day of the (-1, to +1) event window surrounding each merger 
announcement. 
 
SIZE = the log of target’s market capitalization as of the merger announcement 
ACCESS =1 (0 otherwise) if the acquirer’s bank is chosen as an advisor and subsequently lends 
to the acquirer up to one year after the merger announcement date. 
RELSIZE = the target’s market capitalization divided by the acquirer’s market capitalization as 
of merger announcement date (measured as a decimal). 
 
TB_BT x DTARADV (AB_BA x DACQADV) =1 if the dependent bank is the target’s 
(acquirer’s) advisor and had a prior banking relationship with the target (acquirer).  
TB_BA x DTARADV (AB_BT x DACQADV) =1 if the dependent bank is the target’s 
(acquirer’s) advisor and had a prior banking relationship with the acquirer (target). 
 
AB_BT x DTARADV (TB_BA x DACQADV) =1 if there is a relationship between the target 
(acquirer) and the acquirer’s (target’s) advisor, but the dependent bank is the target’s (acquirer’s) 
advisor.  
AB_BA x DTARADV (TB_BT x DACQADV) =1 if there is a relationship between the acquirer 
(target) and the acquirer’s (target’s) advisor, but the dependent bank is the target’s (acquirer’s) 
advisor.  
 
 
(Table 7 Continued next page) 
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Table 7 
 
 
Independent Variables 
Specification (1) 
 
Specification 
(1) 
 
Specification 
(2) 
 
Independent Variables 
Specification (2) 
Intercept -0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
Intercept 
TB_BT 0.0017 
(0.0026) 
0.0018 
(0.0037) TB_BT × DTARADV 
TB_BA 0.0012 
(0.0029) 
0.0040 
(0.0048) TB_BA × DTARADV 
AB_BT -0.0004 
(0.0023) 
0.0017 
(0.0049) AB_BT × DTARADV 
AB_BA -0.0049** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0024 
(0.0041) AB_BA × DTARADV 
DTARADV -0.0002 
(0.0027) 
0.0027 
(0.0031) TB_BT × DACQADV 
DACQADV -0.0072** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0005 
(0.0036) TB_BA × DACQADV 
  -0.0018 
(0.0025) AB_BT × DACQADV 
  -0.0059*** 
(0.0023) AB_BA × DACQADV 
MARKET 1.2862*** 
(0.0244) 
1.2876*** 
(0.0244) 
MARKET 
EVENT PERIOD 0.0052 
(0.0040) 
-0.0008 
(0.0018) 
EVENT PERIOD 
SIZE 0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
SIZE 
ACCESS 0.0036 
(0.0031) 
0.0040 
(0.0032) 
ACCESS 
RELSIZE 0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
RELSIZE 
R2  
Adjusted R2 
19.25% 
19.17% 
19.25% 
19.16% 
R2  
Adjusted R2 
Number of Observations 
 
11,825 11,825 Number of Observations 
 
Notes: *, ***, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  
